Introduction
During the past several decades, civil disorders and wars have afflicted many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and at the same time the region's AIDS epidemics have emerged as a major health crisis. Although most early analyses of Africa's AIDS epidemics ignored wars, some experts speculated that wars accelerated HIV transmission. For example, in one of the first AIDS reports from Uganda, Serwadda, Sewankambo, Carswell, Bayley,Tedder,Weiss et al. (1985, p. 852) proposed that 'movements of the Tanzanian army in 1980' might have propagated HIV in Uganda. In the mid-1990s, the World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNAIDS (1996, p. 6) generalised that 'HIV spreads fastest in conditions of poverty, powerlessness, and social instability -conditions that are often at their most extreme during emergencies'.
However, during the 1990s AIDS epidemic researchers recognised evidence that did not fit these views. Tarantola and Schwartlander (1997) noted that Mozambique, a country that had suffered a long-term civil war, had lower HIV prevalence than neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, they considered that available information did not demonstrate a causal relationship.Writing several years later, Melo, BebyDefaux, Faria, Guiraud, Folgosa, Barreto et al. (2000, p. 203) hypothesised that 'The isolation of Mozambique during years of the civil war from 1976 to 1992 probably limited the spread of HIV epidemic'. Salama and Dondero (2001, p. S6 ) discuss migration and other social disruptions 'that may increase HIV transmission in complex emergencies,' but the data they present show relatively low HIV prevalence in many African countries 'affected by major complex emergencies' in the 1990s.
Evidence that Africa's long-term civil disorders and wars are associated with relatively slow epidemic expansion has accumulated in recent years.This paper summarises the evidence and discusses implications for understanding and preventing generalised HIV epidemics.This evidence contributes to an ongoing debate about the factors that explain differential HIV epidemic trajectories (Boerma, Gregson, Nyamukapa & Urassa, 2003; Buve, Caraël, Hayes, Auvert, Ferry, Robinson et al., 2001; Garnett & Fraser, 2003; Gisselquist, Potterat & Brody, 2004) . One unresolved issue in this debate -an issue crucial to the design of HIV prevention programmes -is the contribution of blood exposures during health care to generalised HIV epidemics. One possible explanation for relatively slow epidemic growth during civil wars is that HIV transmission through unsterile health care accounts for an important proportion of HIV transmission during peacetime, but much less when wars disrupt health care delivery. However, other explanations are also possible. Outstanding questions about the role of health care in Africa's HIV epidemics await conclusive empirical resolution.
Methods
During the last several decades, seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced civil disorders and wars lasting for at least 10 years and interrupting government functions over large areas of the affected countries (Peace Pledge Union Online, 2004a; see below for country-specific references). Moving counterclockwise from west Africa, these seven are Sierra Leone (civil war 1991 Leone (civil war -2002 , Liberia (civil war from 1989 and continuing), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC; collapse of government functions followed by civil war from 1991 and continuing), Angola (civil war 1976 -2002) , Mozambique (civil war 1975 Mozambique (civil war -1992 , Somalia (civil war from 1988 and continuing), and southern Sudan (civil war from 1983 and continuing). Africans have fought many other shorter or more localised wars in recent decades; however, data on HIV prevalence are generally too weak to convincingly demonstrate an impact on epidemic trends during these more limited events.
For each of the long-term wars, I report evidence on HIV prevalence (including HIV-1 and HIV-2 infections) in adults (usually persons aged 15 -49 years) before, during, and at the end of the war, or the latest data in continuing wars, and the post-war epidemic trajectory (relevant for Mozambique only). For comparison, I report levels and movements of HIV prevalence in neighbouring countries over time. Long-term trends in HIV prevalence, as considered in this paper, imply matching long-term trends in HIV incidence (although short-term fluctuations in incidence may not be reflected in long-term trends in prevalence).
A major challenge in this study has been to choose the best data to demonstrate levels and movements in HIV prevalence.This is a problem not only in countries at war, where data are scarce, but also in neighbouring countries that are at peace. UNAIDS' estimates of country HIV prevalence, which are calculated from HIV prevalence in selected antenatal clinics, have serious problems for this study. Firstly, they are not available before 1994, whereas all wars considered in this paper began no later than 1991. Secondly, they are not comparable across years: country estimates may show large year-to-year fluctuations based on statistical adjustments rather than epidemic realities (e.g. UNAIDS estimated 2.9 million HIV infected Ethiopians in 2000 [UNAIDS, 2000a] , but only 1.9 million in 2001 [UNAIDS, 2002a] ). And finally, UNAIDS' estimates have an apparent upward bias: comparable estimates of HIV prevalence are available for six African countries from random sample national surveys; UNAIDS' estimates are 0 -177% (mean of 64%) higher than these survey-based estimates (Table 1) .
To avoid overestimating differences between HIV prevalence in countries at war and neighbours at peace, for comparison countries at peace I choose data that are not transparently biased toward the high end. When available, I report adult HIV prevalence from random sample national surveys (Table 2) . In most cases, the best available information comes from sentinel surveys in selected antenatal clinics. Since urban clinics tend to report relatively high rates of HIV prevalence that are unrepresentative for the nation, for comparison countries I report medians of HIV prevalence among all antenatal clinics in the country, or among antenatal clinics 'outside major urban areas'. In exceptional cases, I use other data to characterise HIV prevalence in countries at peace (see notes to Table 2 ).
For the seven countries with long-term civil disorders or wars, I report data as available from studies before, during, and in several cases after the war. In some cases, I report data from urban centres; since urban data may overestimate HIV prevalence in the country, use of these data tends to underestimate differences between countries at war and their more peaceful neighbours. For six of seven civil wars, I examine the impact on HIV prevalence for the country as a whole; for Sudan, I consider HIV prevalence for the south only, since the impact of the war has been highly concentrated in that region.
Results: trajectory of HIV epidemics during long-term civil wars

Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone entered a period of brutal civil war in 1991, when Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels entered from Liberia (United Nations, 2004) . During the ensuing decade, the RUF terrorised much of the rural and, at times, urban population while living off profits from diamond mines (Campbell, 2004) .The government, even with military assistance from the United Nations (UN) and United Kingdom, was unable to ensure security. Government services were minimal to non-existent. After an agreement with the rebels, the UN declared in January 2002 that the war was over (Peace Pledge Union Online, 2004b) . In a national survey shortly after the end of the war, 0.6% of men and women aged 12 -49 years reported a war-related amputated limb, 9.4% of youth aged 12 -17 years reported one or both parents killed or missing, and 6% of women aged 12 -49 years reported forced sex with someone other than their regular partner in the last 12 months (Kaiser, Spiegel, Salama, Brady, Bell, Bond et al., no date) .The country is extremely poor; according to recent estimates, only 45% of adult men and 18% of adult women are literate, and life expectancy is below 40 years (UNAIDS, 2000a) .
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HIV was present in Liberia at low levels at the beginning of the civil war. Studies in 1987 -89 reported 1 -4% HIV prevalence in tuberculosis patients, 0 -0.6% in blood donors, and 0 -0.7% in visa applicants (US Census Bureau, 2003 AIDS is an old epidemic in the DRC. Sequencing of HIV collected in 1997 found many samples that did not cluster with known clades (Vidal, Peeters, Mulanga-Kabeya, Nzilambi, Robertson, Ilunga et al., 2000) , indicating that HIV was spreading in the DRC not long after the most recent common ancestor, which has been dated to 1931 (95% confidence interval: 1915 -1941 ) (Korber, Muldoon,Theiler, Gao, Gupta, Lapedes et al., 2000) .The oldest known HIV was isolated from a blood sample collected in or near Kinshasa in 1959 (Nahmias,Weiss,Yao, Lee, Kodsi, Schanfield et al., 1986) . Blood collected in rural Equateur Province (northwest DRC) in 1976 and 1986 showed a stable 0.8% HIV prevalence over a decade (Nzilambi, De Cock, Forthal, Francis, Ryder, Malebe et al., 1988) . In the early 1980s, the DRC was one of the first countries in Africa in which AIDS was recognised.
During 1984 -91, multiple studies found HIV prevalence around 5% in low-risk adults in Kinshasa.
A 1984 survey of health workers found 8.1% of women and 5.2% of men with HIV infection (Mann, Francis, Quinn, Bila, Asila, Bosenge et al., 1986) . In 1987 -88, HIV prevalence among men working at a bank and their wives was 5.8% and 5.7%, respectively, somewhat higher than the 2.8% and 3.3% found among men working at a textile factor and their wives (Ryder, Ndilu, Hassig, Kamenga, Sequeira, Kashamuka et al., 1990) . In this, as in many other early studies in Africa, higher status and income was associated with higher HIV prevalence. During 1986 -91, median HIV prevalence in urban antenatal clinics ranged from 4.7% to 7.1% and outside major urban areas from 1.1% to 3.8% (omitting years with only one clinic reporting in a category) (UNAIDS, 2000d) .
From the mid-to-late 1980s, evidence suggests stable or declining HIV prevalence in the DRC. After a 1997 study of HIV in antenatal women, blood donors, tuberculosis patients, commercial sex workers, and STD patients in three locations (Kinshasa, MbuyiMayi, a south-central city, and Bwamanda, a northern town), the study team reported that 'Despite the social disruption, the rapid decline in health-care provision, and the decrease in funding in health education programmemes, our results show that the HIV seroprevalence rates remain relatively low and stable in DRC' (Mulanga-Kabeya, Nzilambi, Edidi, Minlangu, Tshimpaka, Kambembo et al., 1998, p. 908) .The median HIV prevalence in three urban antenatal clinics in 1997 was 3% and in 14 clinics outside major areas it was 3.7% (UNAIDS, 2000d In the mid-to-late 1980s, after more than 10 years of civil war, HIV was found in Angola at low rates, with differences across provinces. A 1986 study found 0.3% of antenatal women, 4% of inpatients, and 1% of tuberculosis patients in Luanda, the capital, to be HIVpositive (Bottinger, Palme, da Costa, Dias & Biberfeld, 1988 (Watts, Corwin, Omar & Hyams, 1994) . In 1995, a study in Mogadishu found no HIV infection among 157 blood donors, 57 inpatient adults, and 42 inpatient children (Nur, Groen, Elmi, Ott & Osterhaus, 2000) .The authors observe that 'during the civil war in Somalia, no evidence of an increase in HIV-1 infections was found (p. 137)'.The latest information on antenatal women in Mogadishu showed no HIV infections in 1998 (UNAIDS, 2002h). However, in northern Somalia (Somaliland), HIV has been found at low levels in the general population: a 1999 study in three cities reported 0.9% HIV prevalence in antenatal clinics and 4.6% among 314 tuberculosis patients (Abokor, 2000) .
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HIV prevalence in Somalia has been much lower than in neighbouring countries. Kenya (Prunier & Gisselquist, 2003) . Despite progress in talks, fighting continues in early 2004.
In 1986, a study of 130 inpatients with fever in Juba, a southern city, found HIV in two, a prisoner and a Ugandan soldier (Woodruff, Morrill, Burans, Hyams & Woody, 1988) .Three years later, another study in Juba identified HIV in 3% of outpatients, 19% of tuberculosis inpatients, and 16% of prostitutes (McCarthy & El Hag, 1990 (Korber et al., 2000; Vidal et al., 2000) . One hypothesis that fits this evidence is that immunodeficiency viruses crossed from chimpanzees to humans through a cut hunter, and then spread through unsterile health care, including especially intensive programmes to find and treat trypanosomiasis in French and Belgian colonies in central Africa during 1930 -1950 (Gisselquist, 2004 . However, Hooper's (2000) hypothesis that oral polio vaccines introduced HIV into Rwanda in the 1950s does not fit the genetic evidence.The regions of Tanzania and Uganda where Tutsi refugees settled around 1960 were recognised over 20 years later with high HIV prevalence. Hence, ethnic violence in Rwanda may have spread HIV to neighbouring countries through refugee resettlement. Serwadda et al. (1985) and Hooper (2000) speculate that Uganda's 1978-79 war with Tanzania contributed to Uganda's HIV epidemic. In October 1978, Ugandan soldiers crossed the border with Tanzania west of Lake Victoria and occupied over 1 000 km 2 , and then withdrew several weeks later.Tanzanian troops assembled in northwest Tanzania from November 1978, invaded Uganda in January 1979, and took Kampala in April (Kasozi, 1999) .While the occupied area in Tanzania and invasion routes through southwest Uganda were later found to have high HIV prevalence, large groups of soldiers spent no more than a few months in these regions.This was probably too little time for more than about 1% to have become HIV-infected, which in turn limited their potential role as vectors for HIV transmission (cf. in five studies of African men in serodiscordant couples in which many men were unaware of their wife's HIV status, their unweighted average HIV incidence was 7.1 per 100 person years (PYs) [Gisselquist & Potterat, 2003 ]; other studies report HIV incidence of 6.6 per 100 PYs among Kenyan truckers [Martin, Jackson, Mandaliya, Bwayo, Rakwar, Nyange et al., 1994] and 2.0 per 100 PYs among Tanzanian policemen [Bakari, Lyamuya, Mugusi, Aris, Chale, Magao et al., 2000] ). Hence, it seems more likely that high HIV prevalence in border regions built up over time, both before and after the war, and that peacetime commerce and travel contributed more than troop movements to the spread of HIV to other parts of Uganda and Tanzania.
Several authors have hypothesised that Guinea-Bissau's liberation war in 1963 -74 contributed to the spread of HIV-2 through increases in sexual and health care exposures (Hooper, 2000; Poulsen, Aaby, Jensen & Dias, 2000) . A variety of evidence supports this hypothesis, but also fits patterns of peacetime, urbancentered HIV epidemic growth common in Africa. Genetic analyses of HIV-2 samples collected in Guinea-Bissau in 1989 -92 suggest a transition around 1955 -70 from no growth to 20% annual epidemic growth (Lemey, Pybus,Wang, Saksena, Salemi & Vandamme, 2003) . According to this evidence, whether or not growth began during the war, it continued for 15 years after the war.The geographic distribution of infections in 1980 was centered on Bissau, the capital (Piedade,Venenno, Prieto, Alburquerque, Esteves, Parreira et al., 2000) . Many of those found infected in samples collected during 1980 -92 were too old or too young to have been involved in much sexual transmission during the war (Poulsen, Aaby, Jensen & Dias, 2000; Wilkins, Ricard,Todd,Whittle, Dias & Da Silva, 1993) . Moreover, assumptions about the survival of persons with HIV-2 infections are required to interpret this data.
Discussion
This paper describes levels and changes in HIV prevalence in seven African countries experiencing long-term civil disorders or wars over the last several decades. In one country (DRC), adult HIV prevalence appears to have stabilised; in two (Sierra Leone and Somalia), it increased from near zero to less than 1%; in three (Angola, Mozambique, and southern Sudan), it increased from near zero to undetermined but low rates; and in Liberia, adult HIV prevalence increased from near zero, but current rates are unknown. In Mozambique, the one country where post-war movements in HIV prevalence have been observed, prevalence appears to have increased by more than 10% (from roughly 1% to 14%) over the decade from 1992 (UNAIDS, 2002f). Only a handful of countries in southern Africa have experienced greater increases in HIV prevalence over a decade.
These findings are relevant to ongoing research and debate to identify factors that explain differential epidemic trajectories, as well as related debates about what to include in HIV prevention programmes. Some key conclusions are discussed below. (UNAIDS, 2000a) . Declining HIV prevalence in Uganda from 1990 has been widely recognised (Green, 2003) . Less well known are comparable declines suggested by some evidence in Burundi (WHO, 2003) , Rwanda (WHO/AFRO, 2003) , Kagera District in Tanzania (Kwesigabo, 2001) , and possibly other countries and communities as well.
During civil disorders and wars,WHO, UNHCR & UNAIDS (1996, p. 6) recognise 'a strong likelihood that AIDS control activities, whether undertaken by national governments or NGOs, will have been severely disrupted or have broken down altogether'. Hence, it is noteworthy that epidemic trajectories in countries at war compare favourably with what is observed in many countries at peace. Although there is no question that HIV prevention programmes do prevent some HIV transmission (e.g. providing condoms to men who would otherwise contract or spread HIV), the failure to outperform consistently the 'no programme' option observed in countries at war demonstrates that these positive impacts are often outweighed by other factors. However, with few exceptions, even the lowest rates of HIV prevalence in African countries at war or peace are high on a world scale, and represent a failure to prevent spread of HIV beyond high-risk groups such as men who have sex with men, injection drug users, and their sexual partners. Prostitute women are also often a high-risk group in Africa and Asia (which may be due to unsterile health care [Packard & Epstein, 1991] as well as sexual exposures), although not in Europe, where 'prevalence is generally less than 2%, except in settings where most HIV-infected prostitutes seem to be injecting drug users' (Hamers & Downs, 2004, p. 89) .
Low risk for HIV in war zones corresponds to low risk in remote rural populations and in persons with low socioeconomic status Within African countries at peace, HIV is associated with residence in or convenient access to cities or towns. In a 1987 survey in Tanzania, adult HIV prevalence in Bukoba town was 24%, dropping to 10%, 4.5%, and 0.4% in progressively more remote rural wards (Killewo, Dahlgren & Sandstrom, 1994; Killewo, Nyamuryekunge, Sandstrom, BredbergRaden,Wall, Mhalu et al., 1990) . At maternity units in Kimpete, DRC, during 1988 -91, HIV prevalence was 11.7% in women from large cities, 4.3% from small towns, 3.7% from villages within 1.7 kilometers from a main road, and 1.7% from more remote villages (Green, Mokili, Nganzi, Davies, Hardy, Jackson et al., 1992) . In Hlabisa, South Africa, in 1997, HIV prevalence in 11 antenatal clinics varied inversely according to the isolation of the population in each clinic's catchment area (measured as the mean distance from homesteads to a primary or secondary road). Thus, across clinics, HIV prevalence fell roughly 2% per kilometer (r = 0.66, p = 0.002) (Tanser, LeSueur, Solarsh & Wilkinson, 2000) . In a rural district in Malawi in 1987 -90 , HIV prevalence in antenatal women living more than 8 km from a clinic was 4.7% compared with 8.4% for those living closer. In the same study, 17% of women with more than 10 years of education were HIV-positive, compared with 8% with less than four years (Slutsker, Cabeza,Wirima & Steketee, 1994) . In a 1989 -93 study in Rwanda, HIV incidence was 8.6 times greater among urban than rural women (Bulterys, Chao, Habimana, Dushimimana, Nawrocki & Saah, 1994) . Botswana is an exception to this pattern, with comparable levels of
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HIV prevalence in urban and rural antenatal clinics (WHO/AFRO, 1993).
Within urban and rural African communities, HIV is often associated with more education and other measures of high socioeconomic status. A recent review of evidence from published studies found that Africans with more years of schooling were often at higher risk for HIV-positivity. Moreover, the association between education and HIV was comparable in men and women, and stronger in rural populations and older cohorts (Hargreaves & Glynn, 2002) . In a study of urban antenatal women in Malawi in 1989 -90 , having more compared with less than 8 years of education more than doubled the woman's risk for prevalent HIV infection. Similarly, having a husband with more compared with less than 8 years of education more than doubled the woman's risk for HIV, but reduced her risk for STDs (Dallabetta, Miotti, Chiphangwi, Saah, Liomba, Odaka et al., 1993) . In Lusaka in 1985, HIV prevalence ranged from 8% in adults with 0-4 years of education to 33% in those with more than 14 years (Melbye, Njelesani, Bayley, Mukelabai, Manuwele, Bowa et al., 1986) . However, associations between education -and more generally, higher socioeconomic status -and HIV are weaker or even reversed in some recent studies. For example, a 1996 study in Kisumu, Kenya, reported higher socioeconomic status associated positively or negatively with HIV for various age and sex cohorts (Hargreaves, Morison, Chege, Rutenberg, Kahindo, Weiss et al., 2002) .
Alternate views on the importance of HIV transmission through unsterile health care lead to alternate hypotheses for slow spread of HIV during civil wars Since the late 1980s, most AIDS experts have accepted the hypothesis that sexual transmission accounts for almost all HIV infections among African adults. From this viewpoint, differences in sexual risk factors should explain differences in HIV epidemic trajectories across countries. Although hundreds of studies find that sexual behaviour and biological variables are personal risks for HIV infection, research to date has been unable to identify even one such variable that is consistently more common in countries with high compared with low HIV prevalence (Gisselquist et al., 2004) . For example, a recent African study found adults in cities with high HIV prevalence not to have more syphilis, gonorrhoea, chlamydia, and non-marital and concurrent sexual partners than adults in cities with low HIV prevalence (Buve et al., 2001) . In other studies, differences in prevalence of herpes simplex virus 2 (Orroth, Korenromp,White, Changalucha, de Vlas, Gray et al., 2003) and lack of male circumcision (Boerma et al., 2003) across communities do not correlate with differences in HIV prevalence. Hence, the view that sex accounts for almost all HIV transmission to African adults remains an hypothesis in search of evidence.
A competing hypothesis proposes that differences in HIV transmission through blood exposuresparticularly during unsterile health care -drive epidemics in countries where HIV is not concentrated among men who have sex with men, injection drug users, and their sexual partners (Gisselquist & Potterat, 2003; Gisselquist, 2004) .From this perspective, HIV prevention in countries with generalised epidemics should address health care transmission along with sexual risks. Between these two views, there are many possible compromise positions, with health care accounting for more than 5% to 10% of infections, but not enough to drive generalised epidemics. In countries with generalised epidemics, there are to date no reliable estimates of the proportions of HIV infections from sexual and health care exposures, so it is not yet possible to end the debate with an empirical resolution.
Experts who accept the view that sex explains most HIV infections in Africa have tried to explain observed low HIV prevalence during wars as due to low rates of sexual transmission. For example, Mulanga-Kabeya et al. (1998, p. 909) suggest for DRC that 'the high degree of poverty experienced in the country as a result of the political and socio-economic crisis could have contributed in the change of sexual behavior.' For Mozambique, Barreto, Liljestrand, De Sousa, Bergstrom, Bottinger, Biberfeld et al. (1993, p. 687) suppose that 'closed roads and isolation from neighboring countries' limited HIV entry. Although war may reduce the frequency of HIV-infected truckdrivers copulating with sex workers, the level of HIV infection in soldiers and rebels and their sexual activities must be considered as well. It is not at all obvious that civil wars cause a net reduction in sexual risk. WHO, UNHCR & UNAIDS (1996) speculate that wars increase sexual risks (abuse of women and boys, earlier sexual activity, and prostitution) as well as
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On the other hand, if one supposes that unsterile health care accounts for an important proportion of HIV infections in countries with generalised epidemics, then slower epidemic growth during wars may be explained by wars reducing exposures to unsterile health care. Health care services diminish as aid and government health expenditures collapse, and violence drives away health workers and destroys facilities. Lack of access to health care in southern Sudan is demonstrated by a finding of 0% of common pathogens (pneumococci, S. pyogenes, H. influenzae) resistant to common antibiotics in samples collected in 2000 in a rural hospital that had been isolated by civil war for 18 years (Doczeova, Liskova & Kremery Jr., 2003) .
In what might be a macabre parallel to wartime conditions reducing public access to health care and HIV transmission, Seale (1986, p. 123) explains the spread and end of the Ebola outbreak in Yambuka, DRC, in 1976: 'Once the hospital closed on 28 September because of the death of three-quarters of the hospital staff, the epidemic vanished as abruptly as it started, leaving 280 people dead... The cause, and amplifier, of this particularly explosive epidemic was traced by the international team to five hypodermic needles and syringes, the daily allocation for the nurses for use on all ward patients in the 120-bed hospital and on all 400 outpatients per day... [T]he five hypodermics...were never sterilised between use all day.' Evidence for slow growth of HIV epidemics during long-term civil wars may be easier to correlate with wartime reductions in health care exposures than with unknown differences in sexual exposures. If so, the evidence would seem to favour the view that unsterile health care accounts for an important proportion of HIV transmission in Africa. However, alternate interpretations are possible, so that evidence is suggestive, not decisive. Further research in early postwar populations might help to characterise better wartime sexual and blood exposures as risks for HIV infections.
Conclusion
In African communities subject to civil disorder and war, people are impoverished and cut off from government services. Setting aside war-related violence, these wartime conditions are approximated in peacetime among remote rural populations with low socioeconomic status. Factors that explain relatively low HIV prevalence in countries after longterm civil wars may help to explain much of the diversity in HIV epidemic trajectories across African countries and communities. Identifying what those factors might be (e.g. more or different sexual or medical exposures in peacetime than in war) may lead to more effective prevention programmes that will consistently outperform the 'no programme' option.
